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ABSTRACT
Knowledge Spillovers and the New Economy of Cities
Despite much theorizing about the role of geographic concentration of employment in
knowledge spillovers, local densities' role in promoting innovations has largely been
unexamined.  More often, studies have considered the effects of city size variables on
innovative activity, although the role of scale was not the main focus of these studies.
This paper considers the role of knowledge spillovers on innovations at the MSA level.
We use patents per capita in an MSA as our measure of innovations in that MSA. We
find that the rate of patenting is positively related to the employment density of the highly
urbanized portion of an MSA (its urbanized area).   Specifically, we find, on average, that
rate of patenting is 20 percent to 30 percent greater in an MSA with a local economy that
is twice as dense as the local economy of another MSA.  Since local employment density
doubles more than four times in the sample, the implied gains in patents per capita due to
urban density are substantial.  Thus, these findings confirm the widely held view that the
nation’s densest locations play an important role in creating the flow of ideas that
generates innovation and growth.
JEL Codes: O31 and R11
Contact Author: Gerald A. Carlino, Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, Ten Independence Mall, Phil., PA 19106, Phone: (215) 574-6434, Email:
jerry.carlino@phil.frb.org1
INTRODUCTION
An important finding from observing the geographic location of patent
originations is that patenting is largely a metropolitan phenomenon.  During the 1990s,
92 percent of all patents were granted to residents of metropolitan areas, although these
areas account for only about three-quarters of the U.S. population, and for about 20
percent of land area of the continental United States.  Historical data also show that
patent activity is concentrated in cities.  Pred (1966) examined U.S patent data for the
mid-nineteenth century and found that patent activity in the 35 principal cities at that time
was four times greater than the national average.  Higgs (1971) found that the number of
patents issued in the U.S. during the period 1870-1920 was positively related to the level
of urbanization.  Recent research recognizes an important link between national
economic growth and the concentration of people and firms in cities. The high spatial
concentration of people and firms in cities provides an environment in which ideas move
quickly from person to person and from firm to firm. Dense locations, such as cities, are
efficient producers of new ideas, leading to innovation and growth. But, as Jaffe,
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) find, the ability of people to receive ideas or their
distance from the source of the ideas influences knowledge; the communication of ideas
is relatively harder over longer distances. Thus, the high spatial concentration of people
and firms in cities facilitates the exchange of ideas that underlies the creation of new
goods and new ways of producing existing goods.
Surprisingly, local densities’ role in promoting innovations has largely been
unexamined.  More often, studies have considered the effects of city size variables on
innovative activity, although the role of scale was not the main focus of these studies. For2
example, Feldman and Audretsch (1999) find that the level of city employment is
positively related to innovations in metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs).  The papers by
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Sedgely and Elmslie (2001) are two exceptions.  These
authors examine the effects of density on rate of innovation at the state level (Sedgely
and Elmslie) and on state productivity (Ciccone and Hall).
The purpose of this paper is to consider the role of knowledge spillovers on
innovations at the MSA level.  We believe that knowledge spillovers are positively
related to the local employment density.  We use patents per capita in an MSA as our
measure of innovations in that MSA. We find that the rate of patenting is positively
related to the employment density of the highly urbanized portion of an MSA (its
urbanized area).   We take this finding as evidence that highly localized knowledge
spillovers are important for innovation and growth.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Endogenous growth models (e.g., Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988)) suggest that,
among other things, innovation and growth depend on knowledge spillovers among
agents or firms.  As Glaeser (1996) has pointed out, the idea that “growth hinges on the
movement of ideas, naturally led to a re-exploration of the economic role of cities in
furthering intellectual flows.” The notion that cities may enhance knowledge spillovers
and economic growth goes back, at least, to Marshall (1890).  When describing the
benefits of dense concentrations of jobs in cities Marshall noted that “the mysteries of
trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air.” Krugman (1991) noted the
difficulty with measuring knowledge spillovers is that “knowledge flows are invisible,
they leave no paper trail by which they may be measured and tracked.” Jaffe,3
Trajtenberg, and Henderson (1993) point out “knowledge flows do sometimes leave a
paper trail” in the form of patented inventions. They looked at the propensity of new
patents to cited patents that had originated from the same location. They found that a new
patent is 5 to 10 times more likely to cite patents from the same metropolitan area than
one would expect based only on the pre-existing concentration of R&D activity.  They
found that location-specific information spreads out slowly, making geographic access to
that knowledge important to firms. They took these finding as evidence of knowledge
spillovers in metropolitan areas.
While the literature suggests that knowledge spillovers should be enhanced in
denser locations, little research has looked at density’s role in promoting local
innovations.  Ciccone and Hall (1996) found that county employment densities are
important in accounting for differences in productivity levels across states. Sedgely and
Elmslie (2001) look at patents per capita at the state level during the period 1970-95.
They found that patenting at the state level is positively related to state population
density. One problem with the Sedgely and Elmslie study is that the vast majority of the
land area of most states is engaged in low-density rural activities, while its population is
more highly concentrated in the state’s urban areas. Since knowledge spillovers have
been associated with high-density urban activities, measures of density using the entire
area of a state will understate urban density.
Following Glaeser, et al. (1992), much of the empirical research has focused on
the effects of an economy’s industrial structure on innovation and growth. Two types of
externalities thought to be important for innovation and growth have been identified in
the literature.  One type, referred to as MAR (Marshall-Arrow-Romer) spillovers by4
Glaeser et al. (1992), argue that the exchange of ideas is enhanced in local economies that
are highly specialized in one or two activities, such as the concentration of the
semiconductor industry in the Silicon Valley.  Jacobs (1969), however, discounts the
importance of MAR type externalities that work within industries and argues instead that
more industrially diverse local economies, such as New York City, are more conducive to
the exchange of ideas.
1  Feldman and Audretsch (1999) used the United States Small
Business Administration’s Innovation Data Base that consists of innovations compiled
from the announcements of new product in manufacturing trade journals. They found
evidence supporting the diversity thesis of Jacobs.  Glaeser, et al. (1992) provide indirect
evidence by looking at employment growth between 1956 and 1987 across specific
industries in a given city. They found that metropolitan areas that are industrially
diversified grow more rapidly, specialized areas did not.  In contrast, Henderson,
Kuncoro and Turner (1995) examine employment growth rates in five traditional capital
goods industries for 224 standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) from 1970 to
1987 and found that growth was positively correlated with a high past concentrations in
the own industry, supporting the MAR view.  However, these authors note that, unlike
traditional manufacturing, for firms in high-technology industries past industrial diversity
increased the probability that an SMSA attracted a high-tech industry, suggesting that
Jacobs’ externalities play an important role in the development of the high-technology
sector.
Economists have also debated the effects of an area’s market structure on the rate
of innovation and growth.  Chinitz (1961) and Jacobs (1969) believe that the rate of
innovations is greater in cities with competitive market structures.  For example,
                                                
1Pred (1966) also stressed the dynamic advantages of diversity.5
according to Jacobs, local monopolies have the resources to stifle innovations by
competing firms whereas more competitive local environments foster the introduction of
new methods and new products.  More recently, Porter (1990) argued that when local
economies are competitive the innovations of local firms are rapidly adopted and
improved by other neighboring firms. In contrast, he believes that local monopolists tend
to rest on their laurels rather than risk innovation.
Alternatively, according to Glaeser et al. (1992), the MAR view predicts that local
monopoly is superior to local competition, because innovating firms recognize that a
portion of their ideas will be imitated by neighboring firms without compensation. Firms
in locally competitive environments may therefore invest less in research and
development because they do not reap full benefit of such investment. Thus, local
monopoly may foster innovation because firms in such environments have fewer
neighbors who imitate them.  Prior evidence favors the view expressed by Chinitz and
Jacobs as opposed to the MAR view.  Feldman and Audretsch (1999) find that local
competition is more conducive to innovative activity than is local monopoly. There is
also indirect evidence on the issue offered by Glaeser, et al. (1992) finding that local
competition is more conducive to city growth than is local monopoly.
THE MODEL
Consider the following aggregate production function for MSA i:
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Where: Yi,t  represents output in location i at time t, Ki,t represents capital stock in i at t,
Li,t represents labor in i at t,  and  Ai,t  represents Hicks-neutral productivity that differs
across locations.
Differentiating (1) with respect to time yields:
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Which can be rearranged to yield a growth accounting equation:
ii K i L i YA K L η η =+ +    (2)
Where dots over a variable indicate time derivatives, and  and  KK η η are the elasticities of
output with respect to changes in capital and labor, respectively. The main argument of
this paper is localized knowledge spillovers influence the growth of productivity:
log log ii i i Aab S =+  (3)
Where i S represent knowledge spillover in location i, and bi represents the strength of the
spillover in location i. The term i a is a vector reflecting all other productivity factors in
location i. Furthermore,  i S  is assumed to be external to any individual firm in i, but
internal to the firms’ local economy.  We make the assumption that knowledge spillovers
depend on the average value of employment density in location i:








Where E represents total employment in location i, and N is land area in i.  Thus,
employment in an MSA is assumed to be distributed equally across all the acres in the
MSA.7
Glaeser (1996) points out that “urban proximity, the closeness of innovations to
one and another, the closeness of innovations towards the sources of potential demand,
and the closeness of innovators to suppliers and critics, has served throughout history as
an engine by which ideas moved across individuals.” For example, many semiconductor
firms have located their research and development facilities in Silicon Valley because the
area provides a nurturing environment where semiconductor firms can develop new
products and new production technologies. Often information about current
developments in the semiconductor industry is shared on an informal basis. Saxenian
(1994) describes how gathering places, such as the Wagon Wheel Bar located only a
block from Intel, Raytheon, and Fairchild Semiconductor, “served as informal recruiting
centers as well as listening posts; job information flowed freely along with shop talk.”
Other examples of “high-tech hot spots” include the Route 128 Corridor in
Massachusetts, and the Research Triangle in North Carolina, and biotechnology research
and medical technology software companies in suburban Philadelphia.
Examples are not limited to the high tech industry. For example, the geographic
concentration of the motion picture industry in Los Angeles offers a network of
specialists (directors, producers, scriptwriters, script doctors, set designers, etc.), each of
whom focuses on a narrow niche within the industry. The network creates an atmosphere
that encourages collaboration, experimentation, and shared learning among individuals
and firms. In the medical field, research facilities and teaching institutions have
concentrated along York Avenue on Manhattan’s Upper East Side to enhance knowledge
spillovers among researchers at different institutions. York Avenue is home to Memorial
Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, Rockefeller University and Hospital, and New York8
Presbyterian medical center. Porter (1990) cited the Italian ceramics and ski boot
industries and the German printing industry, among others, as examples of geographic
concentrated industries that grew rapidly through the continual introduction of new
technologies.
There are also examples of knowledge spillovers across firms in different
industries. McDonald (1997) has pointed out that both Jacobs (1969) and Jackson (1988)
have noted that Detroit’s shipbuilding industry was the critical antecedent leading to the
development of the auto industry in Detroit. In the 1820s Detroit mainly exported flour.
Because the industry was located north of Lake Erie along the Detroit River, small
shipyards developed to build ships for the flour trade. This shipbuilding industry refined
and adapted the internal-combustion gasoline engine to power boats on Michigan’s rivers
and lakes.
As it turned out, the gasoline engine, rather than the steam engine, was best suited
for powering the automobile. Several of Detroit’s pioneers in the automobile industry had
their roots in the boat engine industry. For example, Olds produced boat engines, and
Dodge repaired them. In addition, a number of other industries in Michigan supported the
development of the auto industry, such as the steel and machine tool industries. These
firms could produce many of the components required to produce autos.
EVIDENCE
Since data on innovations are not generally available at the local level, patents per
capita in an MSA are used as our measure of innovation. Using patents as a measure of
innovations has shortcomings since some innovations are not patented and patents differ9
enormously in their economic impact.  Nonetheless, patents are a useful measure of the
generation of ideas in cities. We estimate a cross-sectional model where the rate of
patenting in an MSA is regressed on several alternative measures of local employment
density (defined below) and a number of other variables thought to affect patenting at the
MSA level as discussed in the text.  The sample consists of 296 of the 313 MSAs and
primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs).
2  Specifically, we estimate the following
equation:
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where
 Average patents per capita, 1990-99 in MSA i  i P =
D  The density of employment in 1989 in the ith MSA's urbanized area.
Two alternative measures are used: in model (1) employment density = MSA employment divided 
by square miles in the MSA's urbanized
i =
 area; in model (2) employment density = employment in the 
county containing the MSA's central city divided by square miles in the urbanized area.
1989 level of employment in MSA i i E =
= University R & D spending in science and engineering programs, 
average for the period 1989-91 in MSA i
i U
= Percent of firms with 1,000 or more employees in 1989 in MSA i i PCTLG
 Manufacturing share of total employment in MSA i, in 1989 i PCTMAN =
= Percent of 1990 population with at least a college degree in MSA i i PCTCOL
                                                
2Since PMSAs are treated as MSAs in this study, we refer to them as MSAs.  We do not consider
consolidated metropolitan statistical areas (CMSAs) in this study.  A 1983 definition for MSAs and PMSAs










 = Measure of local competition = Total number of firms in MSA i divided by total 
employment in MSA i
i COMP
employment growth rate in MSA i during the period 1979-89. i EMPGT =
The dependent variable refers to patents per person averaged over the period
1990-99, whereas the independent variables are at 1989 or roughly beginning-of-the-
period values.
3 This reduces the simultaneity and reduces direction of causation issues,
since the value of the dependent variable that is averaged over the 1990s is not likely to
affect beginning-of-period values of the independent ones. We chose metropolitan
statistical areas (MSAs) and primary metropolitan statistical areas (PMSAs) as the main
geographical unit for our analysis, since MSA and PMSAs boundaries reflect the extent
of local labor markets.
To investigate the relationship between innovation and density, we need a
measure of local employment density.  Employment density varies enormously within an
MSA.  Typically, employment density is highest in the central business district (CBD) of
an MSA’s central city and generally falls off as we move away from the CBD. An
urbanized area is defined as the highly dense area within an MSA.
4 If knowledge
spillovers are important, it’s likely that urbanized areas with high-employment density
                                                
3We use utility patents granted to U.S. inventors.  Patent data were provided at the county level and
aggregated to MSAs based on the 1983 MSA definitions. The geographic distribution of patents is based on
the residence of the inventor whose name appears first on the patent and not the location of the inventor’s
employer.
4 The Census Bureau defines an urbanized area as one with a total population of at least 50,000, consisting
of at least one large central city and a surrounding area with a population density greater than 1000 people
per square mile.11
would account for most of them.
Ideally, we want to use employment density in the urbanized area of the MSA to
investigate the relationship between density and innovation. While we can measure the
land area of the urbanized part of an MSA, employment data are not available for
urbanized areas of MSAs. So we used two alternative measures for local employment
density. Our first measure for local employment density assumes that all employment in
an MSA is located within the MSA’s urbanized area. This assumption means that our
first measure overstates both employment and local employment density. Our second
measure is the ratio of employment in the county containing the MSA’s central city to
square miles in the urbanized area of the MSA. Since the urbanized area is defined to
include the MSA’s central city and the highly dense surrounding areas, our second
measure understates both employment and employment density in urbanized areas.  By
using these alternative measures for local employment density, we believe that the two
estimates of the effect of local employment density on the rate of patenting obtained in
our analysis will capture the true effect of density on innovation.
5  As Figure 1 shows,
data for the 1990s on 270 MSAs (MSAs for which urbanized areas are defined) reveal a
positive association between patents per capita and local employment density.
We also include MSA employment size in 1989 to control for both “scale effects”
and for localized concentrations of employment/production that may be the result of
static agglomeration economies.
 6  The scale effect takes into account the fact that larger
economies (in terms of employment) devote more resources to innovation and therefore
                                                
5As might be expected, the two alternative measures of local employment density are highly correlated; the
simple correlation is 0.91.
6This article uses private non-farm employment as reported in County Business Patterns.12
generate more patents per capita for a given level of density.  Feldman and Audretsch
(1999) find that innovative activity increases with MSA size.
R&D spending in science and engineering programs at colleges and universities is
included separately, since many authors have found spillovers from such spending and
innovative activity at the local level (see for example, Anselin, Varga and Acs (1997),
Jaffe (1989), and Audretsch and Feldman (1996)).
7   Similarly, since large firms tend to
spend proportionately more on private R&D than do smaller firms, the percentage of an
MSA’s firms with 1000 or more employees is included separately to capture the presence
of large firms on patent activity.  In addition, manufacturing share of total MSA
employment is also included in the list of independent variables to control for the fact
that more patents originate in manufacturing than in other sectors.
8  The percent of an
MSA population with at least a college degree is included to separately account for the
role of educational attainment and patenting.
We need to develop a measure of industrial diversification of a local area or lack
of it to gauge the extent to which the rate of MSA patenting is related to MAR or Jacobs
externalities. This measure will be based on a Herfindahl index.  Specifically, the
measure of diversification or inversely specialization is calculated by squaring and
summing the share of MSA employment accounted for by each of seven industries ( j V ):
9
                                                
7The data used for university research expenditures are compiled from NSF Survey of Scientific and
Engineering Expenditures at Universities and Colleges and Federally Funded Expenditures at R&D
Development Centers.  The data were averaged for the period 1989-91.  The data on firm size were
obtained from County Business Patterns.
8Data to construct the percent large firm variable are obtained from County Business Patterns.
9The seven industries are manufacturing; transportation, communications, and public utilities; wholesale
trade; retail trade; services; finance, insurance, and real estate; and other industries.  Construction’s share of
private non-farm employment was not included in the calculation of the index because of disclosure
problems associated with this variable for some MSAs in our sample.  We also controlled for industry-mix
differences across MSA by including the share of total MSA employment accounted for by industry.  With










The index assigns weights of unity to each industry’s share of employment and the
squaring means that the larger industries contribute more than proportionately to the
overall value of the index.  Thus, as the index increases in value for a given MSA this
implies that the MSA is more highly specialized or less diversified industrially.
We need a measure of a local area’s market structure to test whether knowledge
spillovers are greater if an MSA is competitive. Following Glaeser, et al. (1992), the total
number of firms per worker in an MSA is used as a measure of market structure, i.e., an
MSA is taken as locally competitive if it has many firms per worker.
 10 Finally,
employment growth during the period 1979-89 is included to control for any independent
effect that local growth may have had on patent activity.
Findings. Table 1 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in the
analysis.  The table gives the mean, standard deviation and minimum and maximum
values for the variables.  For example, the table shows patents per 10,000 people, which
is the dependent variable used in the regressions to follow.  The mean value for patents
per 10,000 people is 2.265 for the 296 MSA in our sample. The San Jose, California
MSA ranked first, averaging almost 18 patents for every 10,000 people, while the
Laredo, Texas MSA was last, with 0.061 patents for every 10,000 people.  As the table
shows, the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum statistics for the two
alternative measures of local employment density have quite similar values.  As expected,
                                                                                                                                                
Therefore, only manufacturing share of total MSA employment is included in the regressions reported in
this article.
10Data for this variable are obtained from County Business Patterns.14
the mean of 1327 for urbanized area central city county employment density variable is
less than the mean of 1476 for urbanized area MSA employment density variable.  In
general, Table 1 shows substantial variation in all other variables used in the model.
Figure 1 plots the log of patents per capita against the log of local employment
density (log of the ratio of MSA employment to land in the urbanized area).  The figure
shows a moderately positive correlation between patenting and density; the correlation
coefficient is 0.50.  Figure 2 plots the log of patents per capita against the log of local
employment density (log of the ration employment in the county containing the central
city to land in the urbanized area).  The figure also shows a moderately positive
correlation between patenting and density; the correlation coefficient is 0.43.
The model was estimated in log form using ordinary least squares methods with
White robust standard errors to take heteroskedasticity into account. The results of the
regression are presented in Table 2.  As indicated, one problem is that employment data
for urbanized areas are not available. Therefore, we must estimate it. In model (1) we
assume that all employment in an MSA is located within its urbanized area. This
assumption overstates both employment and employment density in urbanized areas.  In
model (2) we assume that all employment in an MSA is located within the county that
contains the MSA’s central city.  This assumption understates both employment and
employment density in urbanized areas.
11 As the results of both models show, the effect
of employment density on patenting is positive and highly significant. These findings
suggest the importance of close spatial proximity in promoting spillovers and fostering
                                                
11On average, the county containing an MSA’s central city accounts for 84 percent of MSA employment.15
innovation.
 12 A number of other variables in the model have the expected positive
association with the rate of MSA patenting, including MSA employment size, percent of
MSA firms with 1000 or more employees, percent of MSA employment in
manufacturing, and the percent of MSA population with a college education.  One
anomaly is that university R&D spending has the wrong sign (negative, which suggests
that increased spending by local universities on R&D in science and engineering
programs is associated with fewer patents per capita in an MSA), and this variable is
significant in Model (1).  Jumping ahead, the universities spending on R&D variable
remains negative, but is insignificant, in the fixed-effects version of the model presented
in the next sub-section. Finally, the R
2 statistic, measuring the goodness of fit, shows that
the models explain a little less than 60 percent of the variation in MSA patents per capita
(this is a good fit for a cross-MSA model).
Even if we accept the view that dense local areas serve as centers for the
exchange of ideas, we come back to the issue of whether the rate of exchange is enhanced
in industrial environments that are diverse (for example, New York City) or in more
specialized ones (for example, Silicon Valley).  Feldman and  Audretsch (1999) and
Glaeser, et al. (1992) find evidence supporting the diversity thesis of Jacobs. Conversely,
we find little evidence that diversity, or lack of it, is an important factor in determining
the rate of patenting activity in metropolitan areas in the 1990s.  The coefficient on the
                                                
12 We also run a version of the model using MSA employment density in place of the local employment
density variables.  The MSA employment density variable was positive but not significant. In our sample,
MSA employment size and MSA employment density are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of
0.75).  Thus these two variables tend to “fight” one another for explanatory power when both are included
in the same regression.  Since MSA employment size and the employment density variables based on
urbanized area definitions are only weakly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.38 when MSA
employment is used and 0.21 when employment in the county containing the central city is used) we obtain
independent effects for each of these variables on patenting when both are included in the same regression.16
Herfindahl index is not significant, suggesting that the degree of industrial specialization
of an MSA does not have an impact on MSA patenting.
Finally, we look at the evidence on whether the creation of ideas is greater in
competitive local environments characterized by many small firms than in local
economies dominated by a few large firms.  Recent studies find evidence that local
competition is more conducive to innovative activity (Feldman and Audretsch (1999))
and growth (Glaeser et al (1992)) than is local monopoly.  Counter to these studies, and
to the views of Chinitz and Jacobs, we find that overall patenting is not related to local
competition, or lack of it. The firm per employee variable is not significant, suggesting
that competitiveness of the local economy does not appreciably affect MSA patenting
activity.
Fixed Effects Model.  The regression results reported in Table 3 included dummy
variables designed to see if specific regions of the country contributed more or less to
MSA patenting.  Each MSA was classified into one of eight broad regions (New England,
Mideast, Great Lakes, Plains, Southeast, Southwest, Rocky Mountain, and Far West).
According to the results reported in Table 3, the estimated coefficient on the local
employment density variable, reported in column (1) and column (2) are positive and
highly significant. However, the estimated value for both versions of the local
employment density variable falls in the fixed-effects versions of the model.  The
estimated value in Model (1) falls from 0.42 without fixed effects to 0.31 in the fixed-
effects version of the model, while falling from 030 to 0.21 in Model (2).  The findings
suggest that the number of patents per capita was, on average, 20 percent to 30 percent
higher in an MSA whose local economy was twice as dense as that of another MSA.17
Since local employment density varies by more than 2000 percent across locations in the
sample, the implied gains in patents per capita due to urban density are substantial. For
example, in 1989, the average urbanized area in our sample had about 1500 jobs per
square mile (assuming all jobs in the MSA are located inside its urbanized area). Toledo,
Ohio; Eugene, Oregon; and Omaha, Nebraska are three MSAs with local employment
density at about this average level. These three MSAs averaged 1.8 patents per 10,000
people during the 1990s. If their local employment density were to double, the model
predicts that patents would rise, on average, to 2.3 per 10,000 people. Thus, these
findings are consistent with the widely held view that the nation’s densest locations — its
central cities and their dense inner-ring suburbs — play an important role in creating the
flow of ideas that generate innovation and growth.
We found that MSA patents were higher in the Mideast and Great Lakes regions
relative to the Southeast region; the coefficients for the other regions were not
statistically significant.  The estimates of the effect of local density variables on MSA
patenting were somewhat lower when regional dummy variables are included in the
regressions.
Alternative explanations for positive correlation between patents per capita
and density.  One potential concern is that the rate of patenting may be greater in denser
locations for reasons other than knowledge spillovers. For example, it’s possible that in
urban areas it’s harder to keep information secret, so firms resort to patents. Based on a
survey questionnaire of R&D at 1478 manufacturing firms in 1994, Cohen, Nelson, and
Walsh (2000) report that manufacturing firms typically protect the profits from their
innovations with a variety of mechanisms, including patents, secrecy, and lead-time18
advantages. (The study is referred to as the Carnegie Mellon Survey (CMS).)
Furthermore, the majority of manufacturing firms surveyed indicated that they use
secrecy and lead-time advantages more heavily than patents. In the survey, secrecy
ranked first or second for product innovation in 24 of the 33 industries considered.
More important for our purposes, surveyed firms indicated that concern over
information disclosed in patents is a major reason many choose not to pursue a patent.
Current laws require patents to describe an invention in precise terms. In addition, there
are high fixed costs associated with preparing a patent application. Trade secrets,
however, avoid these fixed costs, but preventing disclosure of the secrets incurs expenses.
Although the CMS does not consider the location of the firms in its sample, its findings
nonetheless suggest that firms may be forced to rely on patenting to a greater extent in
dense areas because it is harder and more costly to maintain secrecy there than in less
dense areas. Thus, it may be this increased difficulty in maintaining secrecy, and not
knowledge spillovers, that account for the positive correlation between patents per capita
and metropolitan density.
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between the effects of knowledge spillovers
and those of secrecy in the empirical model.
13 While secrecy may account for some
portion of the positive association between patents per capita and density, it is unlikely
that it would completely “crowd out” the effects of knowledge spillovers. In addition, the
CMS was limited to manufacturing firms engaged in R&D activity.  Hunt (2001) has
shown that firms in other parts of the economy, such as the financial services, computer
programming, and data processing industries, are increasingly turning to patents to
                                                
13At this time, data that would allow us to discern the role of knowledge spillovers and that of secrecy in
patent activity in dense local areas are not publicly available.19
protect more abstract inventions such as computer programs.  Nonetheless, the extent to
which firms opt for patents in lieu of secrecy in dense local areas is an issue worthy of
future research.
CONCLUSION
The extraordinary recent growth in productivity and jobs in the United States has
been attributed in part to innovations. This article has shown that patent activity of a
metropolitan area is positively related to the density of its highly urbanized portion of
MSAs.  We find that the elasticity of the patent rate with respect to local employment
density is between 0.2 to 0.3 in the fixed-effects version of our model.  This implies, on
average, that rate of patenting is 20 percent to 30 percent greater in an MSA with a local
economy that is twice as dense as the local economy of another MSA.  Since local
employment density doubles more than four times in the sample, the implied gains in
patents per capita due to urban density are substantial.  Thus, these findings confirm the
widely held view that the nation’s densest locations play an important role in creating the
flow of ideas that generates innovation and growth.
Our findings, as well as the findings of other studies, offer little support for the
MAR view that specialization and local monopoly foster innovation. The evidence is
mixed on the Jacobs view that the rate of innovation is higher in industrially diverse and
competitive local economies.  While we find little evidence that the rate of innovation is
greater in diverse and locally competitive environments, studies by Glaeser, et al. (1992)
and by Feldman and Audretsch (1999), however, report results favorable to Jacobs’ view.20
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Patents Per
Capita










257 1327.4 806.1 271.1 7215.9
1989
Employment









296 0.0009 0.0005 0.1e
-06 0.0028
Percent Mfg. 296 0.2164 0.0927 0.0299 0.5691
Percent College
Educated
296 0.1967 0.0674 0.0730 0.5710
Herfindahl
Index
296 0.3028 0.0242 0.2633 0.3873
Firms per
Employee




296 0.2063 0.1922 -0.5064 0.767124
Table 2: The Determinants of Patents Per Capita,







































No. of Obs. 270 257
2 R 0.5991 0.572225
Table 3: The Determinants of Patents Per Capita,







































Far West 0.1060 0.1130
Great Lakes 0.5431*** 0.5198***
Mideast 0.3782** 0.4381***





South West -0.0958 -0.1609
Constant -13.8*** -13.1***
No. of Obs. 270 257
2 R 0.6138 0.616926
Table 4: The Determinants of Patents Per Capita,











































Far West 0.1243 0.1769
Great Lakes 0.1164 0.0826
Mideast 0.2260** 0.2482***





South West 0.0507 0.1817
Constant -0.5863 -4.5***
No. of Obs. 268 255
2 R 0.6138 0.5069